
# Security

SWE 432, Fall 2018
Web Application Development



#### Review: CSS: Cascading Style Sheets

Language for *styling* documents



Selector describes a set of HTML elements

Declaration indicates how selected elements should be styled.

- Separates visual presentation (CSS) from document structure (HTML)
  - Enables changes to one or the other.
  - Enables styles to be *reused* across sets of elements.

### Review: CSS Type Selectors

 What if we wanted more green?

```
h2, h3 {
    color: LightGreen;
}
"Select all <h2> and <h3> elements"
```


Type selector selects one or more element types.

```
* {
        color: LightGreen;
}
"Select all elements"
```

Universal selector selects all elements.



#### Review: GUI Component Frameworks



- Higher-level abstractions for GUI components
  - Rather than building a nav
  - Exposes new options, events, properties
- Integrated component
  - Associate HTML elements with components using CSS classes
  - Framework dynamically updates HTML as necessary through JS
  - Offers higher-level abstractions for interacting with components

### Review: DOM Manipulation

#### Multiply two numbers

```
2 * 3 = 6

Multiply
```

"Get compute element"

# "When compute is clicked, call multiply"

May choose any event that the compute element produces. May pass the name of a function or define an anonymous function inline.

## Today

- Announcements
  - HW2 Grading done this week
  - HW3 is out
  - Midterm next week
- Security
  - What is it?
  - Authentication
  - Most important types of attacks

#### For further reading:

https://www.owasp.org/index.php/
Category:OWASP\_Top\_Ten\_Project#tab=OWASP\_Top\_10\_for\_2013
https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Access\_control\_CORS

### Security

- Why is it important?
  - Users' data is on the web
    - Blog comments, FB, Email, Banking, ...
  - Can others steal it?
    - or who already has access?
  - Can others impersonate the user?
    - e.g., post on FB on the user's behalf



360 Savings® Account


#### Enjoy a competitive interest rate, day in and day out.

Add up the interest with our no-fee, online and mobile savings account that makes it easy to keep track of how much money you're setting aside. Because what you save is important, but what you do with it is even better.

Kids Savings Account

#### Start your kids on a savings adventure.

Get your little ones on a firm financial footing with their own Kids Savings Account. They'll earn a great everyday rate, with no fees or minimums—and you're still in charge of what matters.




#### Security Requirements for Web Apps


- 1. Authentication
  - Verify the identify of the parties involved
  - •Who is it?
- 2. Authorization
  - Grant access to resources only to allowed users
  - Are you allowed?
- 3. Confidentiality
  - Ensure that information is given only to authenticated parties
  - Can you see it?
- 4. Integrity
  - Ensure that information is not changed or tampered with
  - Can you change it?

### Threat Models

- What is being defended?
  - What resources are important to defend?
  - What malicious actors exist and what attacks might they employ?

- Who do we trust?
  - What entities or parts of system can be considered secure and trusted
  - Have to trust something!






client page (the "user")

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
server



HTTP Response

client page (the "user")

server




HTTP Request

HTTP Response

client page (the "user")

Do I trust that this response really came from the server?

server



client page (the "user")

Do I trust that this response *really* came from the server?

malicious actor "black hat"

server


#### Web Thr


#### Picture

Might be "man in the middle" that intercepts requests and impersonates user or server.

**HTTP Request** 

**HTTP Request** 





**HTTP Response** 

client page (the "user")

malicious actor "black hat"


server

Do I trust that this response *really* came from the server?

#### Security Requirements for Web Apps

- 1. Authentication
  - Verify the identify of the parties involved
  - Threat: Impersonation. A person pretends to be someone they are not.
- 2. Authorization
- 3. Confidentiality
  - Ensure that information is given only to authenticated parties
  - Threat: Eavesdropping. Information leaks to someone that should not have it.
- 4. Integrity
  - Ensure that information is not changed or tampered with
  - Threat: Tampering.

# Integrity and Confidentiality



client page (the "user")

malicious actor "black hat"

server

#### Man in the middle

- Requests to server intercepted by man in the middle
  - Requests forwarded
  - But... response containing code edited, inserting malicious code
- Or could
  - Intercept and steal sensitive user data

### HTTPS: HTTP over SSL

- Establishes secure connection from client to server
  - Uses SSL to encrypt traffic
- Ensures that others can't impersonate server by establishing certificate authorities that vouch for server.
- Server trusts an HTTPS connection iff
  - The user trusts that the browser software correctly implements HTTPS with correctly pre-installed certificate authorities.
  - The user trusts the certificate authority to vouch only for legitimate websites.
  - The website provides a valid certificate, which means it was signed by a trusted authority.
  - The certificate correctly identifies the website (e.g., certificate received for "https://example.com" is for "example.com" and not other entity).

### Using HTTPS

- If using HTTPS, important that all scripts are loaded through HTTPS
  - If mixed script from untrusted source served through HTTP, attacker could still modify this script, defeating benefits of HTTPS
- Example attack:
  - Banking website loads Bootstrap through HTTP rather than HTTPS
  - Attacker intercepts request for Bootstrap script, replaces with malicious script that steals user data or executes malicious action

#### Authentication


- How can we know the identify of the parties involved
- Want to customize experience based on identity
  - But need to determine identity first!
- Options
  - Ask user to create a new username and password
    - Lots of work to manage (password resets, storing passwords securely, ...)
    - Hard to get right (#2 on the OWASP Top 10 Vulnerability List)
    - User does not really want another password...
  - Use an authentication provider to authenticate user
    - Google, FB, Twitter, Github, ...

### Authentication Provider

- Creates and tracks the identity of the user
- Instead of signing in directly to website, user signs in to authentication provider
  - Authentication provider issues token that uniquely proves identity of user


## Sign-on Gateway

 Can place some magic "sign-on gateway" before out app - whether it's got multiple services or just one




# Bigger picture - authentication with multiple service providers

 Let's consider updating a Todos app so that it can automatically put calendar events on a Google Calendar



How does Todos tell Google that it's posting something for Prof Hacker? Should Prof Hacker tell the Todos app her Google password?

### We've got something for that...



### **OAuth**


- OAuth is a standard protocol for sharing information about users from a "service provider" to a "consumer app" without them disclosing their password to the consumer app
- 3 key actors:

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- User, consumer app, service provider app
- E.x. "Prof Hacker," "Todos App," "Google Calendar"
- Service provider issues a token on the user's behalf that the consumer can use
- Consumer holds onto this token on behalf of the user
- Protocol could be considered a conversation...

### An OAuth Conversation

Goal: **TodosApp** can post events to **User's** calendar. **TodosApp** never finds out **User's** email or password



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### Tokens?

A token is a secret value. Holding it gives us access to some privileged data. The token identifies our users and app.

#### Example token:

eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6ImU3Yjg2NjFjMGUwM2Y3ZTk3NjQyNGUxZWFiMzI5OWIxNzRhNGVlNWUifQ.eyJpc3MiOiJodHRwczovL3NlY3VyZXRva 2VuLmdvb2dsZS5jb20vYXV0aGRlbW8tNzJhNDIiLCJuYW1lIjoiSm9uYXRoYW4gQmVsbCIsInBpY3R1cmUi0iJodHRwczovL2xoNS5nb29nbGV1c2VyY29ud iwiYXV0aF90aW1lIjoxNDc3NTI5MzcxLCJ1c2VyX2lkIjoiSk1RclFpdTlTUlRkeDY0YlR5Z0EzeHhEY3VIMiIsInN1YiI6IkpNUXJRaXU5U1JUZHg2NGJUe WdBM3h4RGN1SDIiLCJpYXQi0jE0Nzc1MzA40DUsImV4cCI6MTQ3NzUzNDQ4NSwiZW1haWwi0iJgb25iZWxsd2l0aG5vaEBnbWFpbC5jb20iLCJlbWFpbF92Z XJpZmllZCI6dHJ1ZSwiZmlyZWJhc2UiOnsiaWRlbnRpdGllcyI6eyJnb29nbGUuY29tIjpbIjEwOTA0MDM1MjU3NDMxMjE1NDIxNiJdLCJlbWFpbCI6WyJqb 25iZWxsd2l0aG5vaEBnbWFpbC5jb20iXX0sInNpZ25faW5fcHJvdmlkZXIiOiJnb29nbGUuY29tIn19.rw1pPK377hDGmSaX31uKRphKt4i79aHjceepnA8A 2MppBQnPJlCqmqSapxs-Pwmp-1Jk382VooRwc8TfL6E1UQUl65yi2aYYzSx3mWMTWtPTHTkMN4E-GNprp7hXpgD3PncBh1bg1dThPNyjHLp3CUlPP0 QwaAeSuG5xALhzfYkvLSINty4FguD9vLHydpVHWscBNCDHACOgSeV5MzUs6ZYMnBIitFhbkak6z50ClvxGTGMhvI8

m11hIHdWgNGnDQNNoosiifzlwMgDHiF5t3K0L-mxtcNg33TvMAc43JElxnyB4g7gV2hJIOy4MLtLxphAfCeQZA3sxGf7vDXBQ


```
Decoded:
```

```
"iss": "https://securetoken.google.com/authdemo-72a42",
                          "name": "Alsyssa P Hacker",
                          "picture": "https://lh5.googleusercontent.com/-m-OocFU5GLw/AAAAAAAAAI/AAAAAAAAAAH0/BUWkN6DmMRk/photo.jpg",
                          "aud": "authdemo-72a42",
                          "auth time": 1477529371,
                          "user id": "JMQrQiu9SRTdx64bTygA3xxDcuH2",
                          "sub": "JMQrQiu9SRTdx64bTygA3xxDcuH2",
                          "iat": 1477530885,
                          "exp": 1477534485,
                          "email": "alyssaphacker@gmail.com",
                          "email verified": true,
                          "firebase": {
                          "identities": {
                              "google.com": ["109040352574312154216"],
                                  "email": ["alyssaphacker@gmail.com"]
                          "sign_in_provider": "google.com"
                      },
                          "uid": "JMQrQiu9SRTdx64bTygA3xxDcuH2"
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                                                           GMU SWE 432 Fall 2018
```

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### Trust in OAuth

- How does the Service provider (Google calendar) know what the TodosApp is?
- Solution: When you set up
   OAuth for the first time, you
   must register your
   consumer app with the
   service provider
- Let the user decide
  - ... they were the one who clicked the link after all




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#### Authentication as a Service

- Whether we are building "microservices" or not, might make sense to farm out our authentication (user registration/logins) to another service
- Why?
  - Security
  - Reliability
  - Convenience
- We can use OAuth for this!

### Using an Authentication Service



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### Firebase Authentication

- Firebase provides an entire suite of authentication services you can use to build into your app
- Can either use "federated" logins (e.g. login with google, facebook, GitHub credentials) or simple email/password logins. Use whichever you want.
- Getting started guide: <a href="https://github.com/firebase/">https://github.com/firebase/</a>
   FirebaseUI-Web
- Firebase handles browser local storage to track that the user is logged in across pages (woo)

### Top 3 Web Vulnerabilities

- OWASP collected data on vulnerabilities
  - Surveyed 7 firms specializing in web app security
  - Collected 500,000 vulnerabilities across hundreds of apps and thousands of firms
  - Prioritized by prevalence as well as exploitability, detectability, impact

https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP\_Top\_Ten\_Project

### #3 - XSS: Cross Site Scripting

- User input that contains a client-side script that does not belong
  - A todo item:

/><script>alert("LASAGNA FOR PRESIDENT");</script>

- Works when user input is used to render DOM elements without being escaped properly
- User input saved to server may be served to other users
  - Enables malicious user to execute code on other's users browser
  - e.g., click 'Buy' button to buy a stock, send password data to third party, ...

#### #2 - Broken Authentication and Session Management

- Building authentication is hard
  - Logout, password management, timeouts, secrete questions, account updates, ...
- Vulnerability may exist if
  - User authentication credentials aren't protected when stored using hashing or encryption.
  - Credentials can be guessed or overwritten through weak account management functions (e.g., account creation, change password, recover password, weak session IDs).
  - Session IDs are exposed in the URL (e.g., URL rewriting).
  - Session IDs don't timeout, or user sessions or authentication tokens, particularly single sign-on (SSO) tokens, aren't properly invalidated during logout.
  - Session IDs aren't rotated after successful login.
  - Passwords, session IDs, and other credentials are sent over unencrypted connections.

### #1 - Injection

- User input that contains server-side code that does not belong
- Usually comes up in context of SQL (which we aren't using)
  - E.G.,
     String query = "SELECT \* FROM accounts WHERE custID='" + request.getParameter("id") + "'";
- Might come up in JS in context of eval
  - eval(request.getParameter("code"));
  - Obvious injection attack don't do this!

### Validating user input

- Escape Strings that originate from user
- Type of escaping depends on where data will be used
  - HTML HTML entity encoding
  - URL URL Escape
  - JSON Javascript Escape
- Done automatically by some frameworks such as React
- More details: <a href="https://www.owasp.org/index.php/">https://www.owasp.org/index.php/</a>
   XSS\_(Cross\_Site\_Scripting)\_Prevention\_Cheat\_Sheet

# Authentication: Sharing data between pages

- Browser loads many pages at the same time.
- Might want to share data between pages
  - Popup that wants to show details for data on main page
  - Cookies that let user login once for a page and still be logged in when visiting page in separate tab
- Attack: malicious page
  - User visits a malicious page in a second tab
  - Malicious page steals data from page or its cookies, modifies data, or impersonates user

# Solution: Same-Origin Policy

- Browser needs to differentiate pages that are part of same application from unrelated pages
- What makes a page similar to another page?
  - Origin: the protocol, host, and port http://www.example.com/dir/page.html
- Different origins:

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
```
https://www.example.com/dir/page.html
http://www.example.com:80/dir/page.html
http://en.example.com:80/dir/page.html
```

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Same-origin\_policy

## Same-Origin Policy

- "Origin" refers to the page that is executing it, NOT where the data comes from
  - Example:
    - In one HTML file, I directly include 3 JS scripts, each loaded from a different server
    - -> All have same "origin"
  - Example:
    - One of those scripts makes an AJAX call to yet another server
    - -> AJAX call not allowed
- Scripts contained in a page may access data in a second web page (e.g., its DOM) if they come from the same origin

## Cross Origin Requests



https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Access\_control\_CORS

#### CORS: Cross Origin Resource Sharing

- Same-Origin might be safer, but not really usable:
  - How do we make AJAX calls to other servers?
- Solution: Cross Origin Resource Sharing (CORS)
- HTTP header:

```
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: <server or wildcard>
```

• In Express:

```
res_header("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", "*");
```

## Takeaways

- Think about all potential threat models
  - Which do you care about
  - Which do you not care about
- What user data are you retaining
  - Who are you sharing it with, and what might they do with it

#### HW3 Discussion

https://www.jonbell.net/swe-432-fall-2018-web-programming/ homework-3/