Byzantine Fault Tolerance



CS 475, Fall 2019 **Concurrent & Distributed Systems**

- Spreads network/cache costs across users instead of provider
- No server might mean:
 - Easier to deploy
 - Less chance of overload
 - Single failure won't take down the system
 - Harder to attack

Review: Why P2P?



Review: Napster

- The good:
 - Simple \bullet
 - \bullet has it all
- The bad:
 - Server becomes a single point of failure
 - Server does a lot of processing
 - Server having all of metadata implies significant legal liabilities

Finding a file is really fast, regardless of how many clients there are - master





Review: Gnutella

- Gnutella's search approach is called "flooding"
- Cool:
 - Fully decentralized
 - Cost of search is distributed no single node has to search through all of the data
- Bad:
 - Search requires contacting many nodes!
 - Who can know when your search is done?
 - What if nodes leave while you are searching?




- Goal:
 - Get large files out to as many users as possible, quickly
- Usages:
 - Static bulk content (Big software updates, videos, etc)
- User model is *cooperative*

 - While downloading a large file, also sharing the parts that you have • After you get the file, keep sharing for a while too
- Approach relies on a "tracker" per file

Review: BitTorrent



Is our system well behaved?



Start talking about for P2P systems





Byzantine Failures in P2P






- Today:
 - Byzantine failures
 - Blockchain \bullet
- Reminder Course evaluation on Wednesday
- Reminder Project is out!

 - Fault-tolerant, sequentially consistent replicated key value store • Can do in a group (1 to 3 students per group)





Byzantine Faults





Byzantine Faults

- Very large set of ways in which a system might misbehave
- Bugs (perhaps on a single node) \bullet
- Intentional malice (perhaps a single node) \bullet
- Conspiracies (multiple bad nodes)



Byzantine Faults in Practice

- Many cases in aviation, e.g. 777 fly-by-wire control system \bullet
- Pilot gives input to flight computer
- THREE different flight computers
 - AMD, Motorola, Intel
- built by different manufacturers
 - \bullet next
 - Tolerates all kinds of failures

• Each in a different physical location, connected to different electrical circuits,

Different components vote on the current state of the world and what to do

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Byzantine Faults in Practice 737-MAX Edition

- Hardware designers implemented redundant flight controls to determine if plane was pointing its nose too far up
- Pilots cross-check instruments to double check that the failure of a single instrument doesn't crash the plane
- Because of hardware design, plane needs an always-on autopilot system \bullet ("MCAS"), specifically designed to keep the nose of the plane from pointing up too far



Byzantine Faults in Practice 737-MAX Edition

How the new Max flight-control system (MCAS) operates to prevent a stall




Illustration: Norebbo.com



Byzantine Faults in Practice 737-MAX Edition

- MCAS, the thing that can automatically point the plane down does not implement any redundancy
- Result: if the single probe used by the MCAS system gave an invalid result, the plane would point straight down to the ground and crash
- Irony: Boeing prided itself on not relying on software controls, and in having high degrees of mechanical redundancy (in contrast to Airbus)
- Nice article: <u>https://spectrum.ieee.org/aerospace/aviation/how-the-</u> boeing-737-max-disaster-looks-to-a-software-developer.amp.html



Byzantine General's Problem


the generals may be traitors, trying to prevent the loyal generals from reaching agreement" - Lamport, Shostak, and Pease, 1980-2

 "We imagine that several divisions of the Byzantine army are camped outside an enemy city, each division commanded by its own general. The generals can communicate with one another only by messenger. After observing the enemy, they must decide upon a common plan of action. However, some of






Byzantine Generals Problem



Attack!







Byzantine Fault Tolerance

- We tend to think of byzantine faults in an *adversarial* model
 - A node gets compromised, an attacker tries to break your protocol
- Adversary could:
 - Control all faulty nodes
 - Be aware of any cryptography keys
 - Read all network messages
 - Force messages to become delayed
- Also could handle bugs
 - Assuming uncorrelated (independent) failures
- How do we detect byzantine faults?



Byzantine Generals: Reduction

- Easier to reason about a single commander (general) sending his order to the others
- "Byzantine Commander Problem":
 - 1 commanding general must send his order to *n-1* lieutenants ullet
 - All loyal lieutenants obey the same order
 - If the commanding general is loyal, every loyal lieutenant obeys the order he sends
- Consider metaphor:
 - General -> node proposing a new value
 - Lieutenants -> participants in agreement process



- *N* servers
- Client sends request to all
- Waits for all *n* to reply, only proceeds if all *n* agree \bullet



• Problem: a single evil node can halt the system



- 2*f*+1 servers, assume no more than *f* are faulty
- If client gets *f*+1 matching replies, then OK



- Problem: can't wait for the last f replies (same as previous strawman)
- But what if the first *f* replies were from faulty replicas?



- 3*f*+1 servers, of which at most *f* are faulty
- Clients wait for 2*f*+1 replies
 - Take the majority vote from those 2f+1
 - If f are still faulty, then we still have f+1 not-faulty!



Byzantine Fault Tolerance ("Oral messages")

- Assumes conditions similar to if discussion were happening orally, by pairwise conversations between commanders and lieutenants
- Assumptions:
 - Every message is delivered exactly as it was sent Receiver knows who the sender is for every message Absence of a message can be detected (and there is some default)

 - assumed value)



Oral BFT Solution (No Traitors)

- Each commander sends the proposed value to every lieutenant
- Each lieutenant accepts that value •
- (But that isn't really fault tolerant...) \bullet



Oral BFT Solution (m traitors)

- Our solution: OM(m,S) tolerates *m* traitors in a set of *S* participants
- Commander *i* sends his proposed value *v_i* to every lieutenant *j*
- Each lieutenant *i* receives some value v_i from the commander (note they might receive different values if commander is traitor!)
- Each lieutenant has a conversation with each other lieutenant to confirm the commander's order, conducting OM(m-1,S-{i}), recursively



Signed BFT

- In the oral algorithm, a traitor can lie about the commander's orders
- Signed BFT adds an additional assumption:
 - Messages are signed; a loyal participant's signature can not be forged; alteration of the messages contents can be detected
 - Anyone can verify a signature
- Algorithm SM(m):
- General signs and sends its value to each lieutenant \bullet
- For every lieutenant *i*:
 - If the order they receive has m distinct signature on it, then you are done
 - If not, then sign the order, forward to participants who have not signed it





Signed BFT

- Requires 2m+1 nodes to tolerate *m* byzantine faults
- Less messages than the oral approach
- Tricky to implement a system that holds all of the assumptions we set out: • Every message sent is delivered correctly

 - Receiver knows who the sender is
 - Absence of a message can be detected
 - Loyal general's signature cannot be forged; any alteration of a signed message can be detected; anyone can verify authenticity of a general's signature



BFT Disclaimers

- Are byzantine failures truly random? (do they occur independently) lacksquare
 - Does not protect against all kinds of attacks against your system
 - E.g. steal sensitive data
- If anybody can join the network, then an adversary could overwhelm the voting process
- Usually considered as one component of a broader threat model



Threat Models

- What is being defended?
 - What resources are important to defend? \bullet
 - What malicious actors exist and what attacks might they employ?
- Who do we trust? \bullet
 - What entities or parts of system can be considered secure and trusted lacksquare
 - Have to trust something!



Byzantine Faults: Summary

- Most systems are *not* byzantine fault tolerant
- In our best case scenario (the signed message BFT protocol), need 2m+1 nodes to tolerate *m* byzantine faults - expensive!
- Nonetheless important to recognize what failures we do and do not tolerate
- We'll spend the rest of the lecture discussing a very popular BFT protocol... blockchain





What is Money?

- Something that we exchange in financial transactions
- Currency is an agreed upon store of value
 - Facilitates lending, debt, investing, other financial innovations
- We **trust** the value of that currency
- Goal of bitcoin: eliminate all need for trust, plus do it online



A brief history of money: Coins

- Good:
 - Hard to counterfeit
 - Limited inflation
- Bad:
 - Cumbersome
 - Can't mint more if need to go to war

Actual precious metals - value is backed by the intrinsic value of the metal



A brief history of money: Coins

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A brief history of money: Fiat Currency

- Modern (physical) money is based on *fiat* \bullet
 - Value of money is backed by the government that issued it
 - NOT linked to a hard commodity (e.g. gold) baed only on trust
- Why does fiat currency have financial value?
 - Social contract
 - Centralized power





Cash

- Pros:
 - Portable \bullet
 - Semi-anonymous lacksquare
 - Can not spend twice •
 - Can not dispute payment after-the-fact •
 - No need for trusted 3rd party to do a single transaction
- Cons:
 - Doesn't work online lacksquare
 - Easy to steal \bullet
 - Requires trust in the fiat currency



What about credit cards (paypal, venmo, square)?

- Good:
 - Works online
 - Somewhat hard to steal (need some knowledge)
 - Cannot double-spend
 - Can dispute transactions
- Bad:
 - Requires trusted 3rd party to manage transaction
 - Tracks all of your purchases
 - Still requires trust in some physical fiat currency (e.g. US dollars)
 - Transaction fees





Bitcoin

- government, money holders, money changers)
- Works online
- Uses crypto-coins
- No central authority for issuing coins or tracking ownership of coins
- consensus!

Goal: Build a system for electronic cash, but without having any trust (of

Its basis - blockchains - are a form of peer-to-peer byzantine-fault-tolerant





P2P BFT Currency is Hard

- How do we prove who owns a unit of currency?
- Ownership is important for tracking:
 - Forgery \bullet
 - Double spending
 - Theft
- Want to do this without: \bullet
 - Centralized control \bullet
 - Strong identities
 - Physical tokens



Motivating Example: It's Hard.





Ryan "I, Avery hereby transfer 100 coin to Mallory" Problem: How do we know that Avery is Avery?



Cryptocurrencies

- Cryptocurrencies are based on public-key encryption
- by holder of private key

Public Key

Plain text Message

• Encryption review: Using public key, can send message that can only be read

Private Key

Encrypted Message

Plain text Message





Cryptocurrencies

- Cryptocurrencies are based on public-key encryption
- came from us (using our public key)

Private Key

Plain text Message

Encryption review: Using private key, can send messages that can be verified

Public Key

Signed Message

Plain text Message





Bitcoin

- that I own it
- Transfer some bitcoin (say, #10) from A->B
 - is transferring
 - A signs it with their private key

• If I own a bitcoin, then I have the private key that signed it; anyone can verify

• A creates a record that has B's public key, plus the serial # of the coin that A






Bitcoin: Example

Bitcoin 10

B's pub key

A's signature

Bitcoin Transaction 1 Transfers coin 10 from A to B



Bitcoin Transaction 2 Transfers coin 10 from B to C



Bitcoin

- Problem:
 - Where do the serial numbers come from?
 - How do we know that a coin is only spent once?
- Easy answer use a bank/central party:
 - Bank issues serial numbers
 - coin more than once
- Problem:
 - Want decentralized. \bullet

Bank keeps track of who owns each coin; doesn't let you spend the same



Eliminating Serial Numbers

- Each transaction records:
 - The input ID of a previous transaction, taking all value of that transaction
 - Multiple outputs:
 - Some amount
 - The public key of the new owner of that amount
 - A signature generated by the transaction owner's private key
- Where do the first transactions come from?
 - Computationally complex cryptographic puzzles



Consensus on Ownership

- Idea: make everyone that participates keep track of all records as a common log Each participant stores a replica of the log, broadcasts transactions to peers
- NO SERIAL NUMBERS
- How do we keep the peers up to date though? \bullet
 - Paxos?
 - Requires everyone is trusted to not corrupt the log
 - Byzantine fault tolerant paxos?
 - Requires 2/3 trusted to not corrupt the log.
 - How do you move forward even if you find corruption?
 - How easy is it to overwhelm the network with malicious colluding nodes?



Blockchains

- Solution: make it hard for participants to take over the network; provide rewards for participants so they will still participate
- Each participant stores the entire record of transactions as blocks
- Each block contains some number of transactions and the hash of the previous block
- All participants follow a set of rules to determine if a new block is valid

$$h_0 \bigcup_{i=1}^{n_0} h_1 \bigcup_{i=1}^{n_0} h_2 \bigcup_{i=1}^{n_0} h_3 \bigcup_{i=1}^{n_1} h_4 \bigcup_{i=1}^{n_1} h_6 \bigcup_{i=1}^{n_0} h_7 \bigcup_{i=1}^{n_1} h_8 \bigcup_{i=1}^{n_0} h_n \begin{bmatrix} d_n \end{bmatrix}$$



Blockchains

- How do we limit participation?
- Require a "proof of work"
- For the network to accept a new block, it must meet the following requirement:
 - hash(block, nonce) < target
 - *target* is picked a priori
 - nonce is a random value that the client is trying to guess



- Reminder: hashing
 - Takes some arbitrarily long input, produces a fixed-length
 - Same input gives same output
 - output
- Proof of work:
 - hash(block data, nonce) < target
 - Requires brute force

Proof of work

• Making a subtle change in input can result in unpredictable change of



- Each node that is trying to make a new block is called a *miner*
- miner, who will put it in a block
- Miners get paid to create blocks:
 - Transaction fees (roughly ~\$0.10)
 - Reward for making a new block (currently 12.5 btc)


Proof of work

Participants who want to make a transaction need to do so with the help of a





Blockchain's view of consensus



h1	h2	h3	h4	h51		
h1	h2	h3	h4	h52		
h1	h2	h3	h4	h52	h62	

Miner 2


Miner 1:	h1	h2	h3	h4	h51
Miner 2:	h1	h2	h3	h4	h5 ₂
Miner 3:	h1	h2	h3	h4	h52 h62

"Longest chain rule" When is a block truly safe?



Attacks

Worst case: attacker has 99% of mining capacity \bullet



With massive computation power, can rewrite history: nobody can prove which way it was supposed to be

h3

h31		h41	
-----	--	-----	--

h31	h41	
-----	-----	--

h31	h41	





Blockchain & Trust

- Miners don't trust people submitting transactions
 - If you accept an invalid transaction then try to include it in your block, block is rejected
- Miners don't trust each other
 - If you include invalid transactions: rejected
- Nobody trusts miners
 - Requires expending effort to get a new block in





Bitcoin & Anonymity

- Are bitcoin transactions anonymous?
 - NO everyone is identified by their public key
- Are transactions private?
 - NO every transaction since ever is public (this is how we know who owns) what)
- Would you choose to accept bitcoin A for payment, but not bitcoin B? • Yes - you might have opinions on the provenance of each coin!



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